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THE FIRST AMENDMENT, HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM:
TRACHTMAN V. ANKER
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1975, two Manhattan high school students unsuc-
cessfully sought permission from their principal to survey students'
sexual attitudes for the school paper. Initially they had planned to
conduct oral interviews; later they switched their format to a ques-
tionnaire to be randomly distributed and anonymously returned. The
survey covered sexual stereotypes, contraception, and students' opin-
ions about the adequacy of their sex education, and asked them to
classify themselves as heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual, and to
comment on the extent of their sexual experience.' A letter attached
to the questionnaire stressed that it would remain "completely con-
fidential." It also contained the following words of caution: "you are
not required to answer any of the questions and if you feel particu-
larly uncomfortable-don't push yourself. ' 2 The purpose of the sur-
vey, according to the letter, was to provide information for "a human
article expressing human feelings on an underplayed and extremely
important part of our lives.' 3 After the Administrator of Student Af-
fairs denied permission, the students submitted the survey and cover
letter to Irving Anker, Chancellor of New York City Public Schools.
When Anker did not respond, they wrote to the Secretary of the Board
of Education for permission to distribute the survey. Approximately
five weeks later the Board sent the students a letter refusing permis-
sion on the ground that such a survey could be conducted only by
professional researchers with the permission of the students' parents.
When the students requested reconsideration, the Board responded
that in its opinion the questions might harm many students.
In August, 1976, Jeff Trachtman, editor-in-chief of the school
paper, and his father brought an action against the high school prin-
cipal, Anker, the Administrator of Student Affairs, and the Board of
Education seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. They alleged that prohibition of circulation of the question-
1. Trachtman v. Anker, 426 F. Supp. 198, 206-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd in part,
563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1491 (1978).
2. Id. at 205. The survey and cover letter are printed in the appendix to the
court's decision.
3. Id.
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naire and publication of its results violated the first amendment. After
the case was tried upon affidavits submitted by the parties and expert
witnesses, the district court ruled that ninth and tenth graders should
not be polled, but that eleventh and twelfth graders might participate
in the survey, subject to certain restrictions to be negotiated by the
parties.4 Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed. Held, reversed in
part, one judge dissenting. Defendants could not be enjoined from
preventing distribution of the survey to eleventh and twelfth graders.
School authorities with reason to believe that psychological harm
might result to students surveyed at school may prohibit such ques-
tioning without violating the constitutional rights of those seeking to
publish the results. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1491 (1978).
I. THE FIRsT AMENDMENT BACKGROUND: TINKER,
BURNSIDE, AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The starting point for the Trachtman court's discussion was
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the
leading case on the first amendment rights of high school students.0
In Tinker, public school students suspended for wearing black arm-
bands to school in protest of the Vietnam War challenged the con-
stitutionality of a school policy forbidding armbands. "It can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"7
the Supreme Court stated. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Fortas, the
Court held that the students' actions closely resembled "pure speech,"
and were fully protected by the first amendment 8
4. Judge Motley ordered the parties to "agree on a plan by which to distribute,
collect and publish the survey." Id. at 204. Negotiators were to include "a student
representative, a parent representative . . . the principal . . . and a representative of
the Board of Education." Id. A faculty member was to oversee distribution and col-
lection of the survey, and plans were made "for both confidential and public discussion
groups for students who would like to talk with school personnel" after the survey
results were published. Id.
5. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
6. For a discussion of the impact of Tinker on the first amendment rights of sec-
ondary school students, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEMT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
607-09 (1970); Abbott, The Student Press: Some First Impressions, 16 WAYNE L. RnV.
1 (1969); Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59
GEO. L.J. 37 (1970); Traeger, Freedom of the Press in College and High School, 35
ALBANY L. REV. 161 (1971); Note, Constitutional Rights of High School Students, 23
DRAKE L. REv. 403 (1974); Note, Prior Restraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE
L.J. 1325 (1973).
7. 393 U.S. at 506.
8. Id. at 505-06.
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The defendant school officials in Tinker had attempted to justify
their action by arguing that it was prompted by fear of the disruption
that might result from the demonstration. The Court, however, found
those fears speculative, stating that "undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to free-
dom of expression." 9 Balancing the interests of a group of students
in first amendment expression against school officials' right to deter-
mine that "'the schools are no place for demonstrations,' "10 the Court
held that the burden was on the administrators to justify their ac-
tions:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere de-
sire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accom-
pany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding
and no showing that engaging in of the forbidden conduct would
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of ap-
propriate discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition
cannot be sustained."
The Tinker majority quoted with approval an earlier Fifth Cir-
cuit case, Burnside v. Byarsy where high school officials attempted to
prevent the wearing of "freedom buttons" by students, on the ground
that the buttons "'didn't have any bearing on their education,' 'would
cause commotion,' and 'would be disturbing [to] the school program'
. ... , Conceding that state officials might regulate speech to pro-
tect "legitimate state interests,"' 4 the Fifth Circuit balanced "First
Amendment rights with the duty of the state to further and protect
the public school system."' 5 The Burnside court, recognizing the
"wide latitude of discretion"' 6 vested in school authorities, confined
itself to an examination of the reasonableness of the challenged ac-
tion, but nonetheless concluded that the principal's behavior had been
"arbitrary and unreasonable."' 7 Holding that the "Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects the First Amendment rights of school children against
9. Id. at 508.
10. Id. at 509 n.3.
11. Id. at 509, (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
12. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
13. Id. at 746-47.
14. Id. at 748.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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[such] unreasonable rules and regulations imposed by school authori-
ties,""' the court stated:
[W]e must also emphasize that school officials cannot ignore expres-
sions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend. They can-
not infringe on their students' right to free and unrestricted expres-
sion as guaranteed to them under the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution, where the exercise of such rights in the school buildings
and schoolrooms does not materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school.' 9
While both Tinker and Burnside were concerned with students'
seeking to express political views, neither opinion seems to have con-
fined itself to the protection of political speech. "[P]ersonal intercom-
munication among . . . students," the Court noted in Tinker, is "an
important part of the educational process. '20
Until Trachtman, the courts in the Second Circuit adhered to
the Tinker requirement of physical disruption, rejecting other ratio-
nales for interference with first amendment rights advanced by school
administrators. An attempt to regulate expression because of its moral
influence was unsuccessful in Bayer v. Kinzler,21 which held that a
high school principal had violated the free speech rights of his stu-
dents when he seized 700 undistributed copies of a student newspaper
article on contraception. The defendant principal's claims that the
paper posed a "'clear and present danger' that [would] bring about
substantial evils that the state has a right to prevent" and that it vio-
lated the students' parents' right to freedom of religion 22 were rejected
by the district court, which applied Tinker and found that the paper
did not threaten school discipline. Prohibitions of political expres-
sion by teachers-ostensibly because of the influence they exert over
their pupils-have similarly been held unconstitutional under
Tinker.23
Another justification used by school officials who attempt to exert
18. Id. at 747-48.
19. Id. at 749.
20. 393 U.S. at 512.
21. 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975).
22. 383 F. Supp. at 1166.
23. See James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1042 (1972) (upholding the right of a teacher to wear an armband in protest of the
Vietnam War) and Russo v. Central School Dist No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973) (invalidating the dismissal of a teacher who
refused to salute the flag).
[Vol. 27
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control over first amendment activity has been that student publica-
tion and expression should be confined to school-related matters. The
defendants in Zucker v. Panitz,24 who maintained that the Vietnam
War was not connected to school concerns, attempted to keep an anti-
war advertisement out of the school paper. The court found this argu-
ment unpersuasive, noting that "[i]f the [newspaper's] contents were
truly as flaccid as the defendants' argument implies, it would indeed
be a sterile publication. '25
On the other hand, the Second Circuit has recognized the right
of school officials, consistent with Tinker, to prohibit displays or pub-
lications which threaten to disrupt the school environment. The plain-
tiffs in Katz v. McAulay26 had distributed a leaflet in the corridors of
their high school as part of an effort to raise funds for the Chicago
Eight defense. When defendant school officials invoked a Board of
Regents' rule forbidding the solicitation of funds from public school
students, the plaintiffs filed a civil rights action for anticipatory relief
against its enforcement. Acknowledging that the state's power to regu-
late the speech of high school students is limited by the first amend-
ment, the court nevertheless upheld the regulation on the ground that
in-school solicitation was "non-expressive . . .conduct which raise[d]
a sufficiently high probability of harm-i.e. the pressures upon stu-
dents of multiple solicitations-to justify the Board's interference with
such communicative conduct."2 7
The right of school officials to prevent disruption of the learning
environment has been extended to permit them to screen materials
in advance of their distribution. In Eisner v. Stamford Board of Edu-
cation,28 students challenged the constitutionality of such a prior ap-
proval policy. Claiming that the regulation was unsound on its face,
they sought an injunction against its enforcement. The district court
found for the plaintiffs, concluding that the rule imposed a prior re-
straint on student expression. Finding the rule to be "a regulation of
speech, rather than a blanket prior restraint,' 29 the court of appeals
affirmed the lower court, not because the rule was unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad in principle, but instead, because it was proce-
durally defective in that instance.30 In Eisner, Judge Kaufman relied
24. 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
25. Id. at 103.
26. 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).
27. 438 F.2d at 1061.
28. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
29. Id. at 808.
30. Id. at 809.
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on Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire31 to support prior restraints under
limited circumstances8 2 and on the "forecast" exception to Tinker to
uphold the authority of school officials to determine what material
should be distributed on school property: "protected speech in public
secondary schools may be forbidden if school authorities reasonably
'forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities.' "3 In essence, Eisner held that school officials, empowered
by the state to prevent disruptions at school, may determine in ad-
vance what publications may have that effect without unduly restrict-
ing students' first amendment rights.
The Second Circuit has made it quite clear, however, that the
mere possibility of physical disruption of the school atmosphere will
not suffice to overcome students' first amendment rights. From Tinker
to Trachtman the Second Circuit required educators to demonstrate
a narrowly defined basis for restrictions on speech or publication. As
Judge Kaufman explained in James v. Board of Education:
The ultimate goal of school officials is to insure that the discipline
necessary to the proper functioning of the school is maintained
among both teachers and students. Any limitation on the exercise of
constitutional rights can be justified only by a conclusion, based upon
reasonable inferences flowing from concrete facts and not abstrac-
31. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
32. Judge Kaufman noted that prior restraints were permissible to prevent dis-
semination of obscene or libelous materials or " 'fighting words-those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'" 440
F.2d at 806 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572).
33. 440 F.2d at 807 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514). The decision in Eisner
has drawn sharp criticism in the Seventh Circuit. In Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460
F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) Eisner was called "unsound constitutional law." Id. at
1359. The Seventh Circuit held that any system of prior submission of material for
approval was unacceptable:
We believe that the court erred in Eisner in interpreting Tinker to allow
prior restraint of publication-long a constitutionally prohibited power-as a
tool of school officials in "forecasting" substantial disruption of school activities.
In proper context, Mr. Justice Fortas' use of the word "forecast" in Tinker
means a prediction by school officials that existing conduct . . . -if allowed to
continue-will probably interfere with school discipline [citation omittedj.
Tinker in no way suggests that students may be required to announce their in-
tentions of engaging in certain coduct beforehand so school authorities may
decide whether to prohibit the conduct. Such a concept of prior restraint is
even more offensive when applied to the long-protected area of publication.
The Tinker forecast rule is properly a formula for determining when the
requirements of school discipline justify punishment of students for exercise
of First Amendment rights, It is not a basis for establishing a system of censor-
ship and licensing designed to prevent the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Id. at 1358.
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tions, that the interests of discipline or sound education are mate-
rially and substantially jeopardized, whether the danger stems ini-
tially from the conduct of students or teachers. 34
It would seem, therefore, that the Second Circuit has viewed Tinker
as a mandate to school officials to permit public high school students
to exercise first amendment freedoms, so long as their expression does
not seriously threaten to disturb the orderly operation of schools. The
essential vitality of the first amendment seems for the most part un-
diminished in the secondary school setting, although administrators
may exercise control not only over obscene and libelous literature but
also over materials whose contents or mode of distribution will dis-
rupt the educational process. If, however, "students choose litigation to
secure their first amendment rights, school authorities bear the burden
of justifying school action; bare allegations that a basis existed are not
sufficient."8 5
II. TRACHTMAN v. ANKER
Trachtman v. Anker differed from previous secondary school
cases not only because the majority of post-Tinker litigation has dealt
with expressions of political views, distribution of underground news-
papers, or the validity of rules requiring prior submission of literature
for school distribution,3 6 but in two other important respects as well.
34. 461 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
35. Note, Constitutional Rights of High School Students, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 403,
409 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975) (prior submission
rule invalid because lacking "guidance . . . as to what amounts to a 'substantial dis-
ruption of or material interference with' school activities and . . . [because] it failfed]
to detail the criteria by which an administrator might reasonably predict the occurrence
of such a disruption." Id. at 383); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir.
1973) ("[A] regulation requiring prior submission of material for approval before
distribution must contain narrow, objective, and reasonable standards by which the
material will be judged." Id. at 1350); Shanley v. Northeast Ind. School Dist., 462
F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) (students improperly suspended for distributing newspaper
containing information about birth control and marijuana off school premises; "the
school board's burden of demonstrating reasonableness becomes geometrically heavier as
its decision begins to focus upon the content of materials that are not obscene, libelous,
or inflammatory." Id. at 971); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (regula-
tion requiring prior approval of publications is unconstitutional as a prior restraint in
violation of the first amendment); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971)
(school rule prohibiting distribution of newspapers without prior approval from the
principal constitutionally invalid because lacking criteria for authorities to use in making
their determination and without procedural safeguards to review their decision. Id. at
.59); Butts v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) (injunction
granted enjoining defendant school officials from interference with students' right to
wear armbands although officials not required to wait "until disruption actually occur[s]."
19781
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First, the threshold issue was the right of the plaintiffs to gather in-
formation, not to disseminate it. Second, school officials successfully
contended that the right to be free from emotional disturbance out-
weighed first amendment rights.
School administrators in Trachtman did not argue that the right
of students to conduct a survey and publish the results was not pro-
tected by the first amendment. Neither did the plaintiffs contest the
authority of educators to regulate student conduct reasonably likely
to cause substantial disruption of the educational process. Rather, the
plaintiffs argued that the defendants had not adduced enough evi-
dence to support their claim that the risk of psychological harm out-
weighed the plaintiffs' rights.
The majority opinion for the Second Circuit, written by Judge
Lumbard, acknowledged that the "potential disruption" the defend-
ants feared was psychological, not physical, but held that the Tinker
standard required only a showing "that there was reasonable cause to
believe that distribution of the questionnaire would have caused sig-
nificant psychological harm to some of the Stuyvesant students."37 The
majority then reviewed the evidence submitted by the defendants.
Two psychologists and two psychiatrists38 had testified that the distri-
bution of the survey could cause grave psychological damage, at least
to some students. One stated that for adolescents with a " 'brittle' sex-
ual adjustment," the questionnaire posed the danger of "push[ing]
them into a panic state or even a psychosis." 39 Another described the
questions as "highly inappropriate" for students twelve to fourteen
years old.40 Two of the defendants' witnesses were concerned that the
survey failed to provide "back up support or protection ' 41 for students
disturbed by the questions.
The five experts who testified for the plaintiffs, including plain-
tiff Gilbert Trachtman,2 offered opinions which directly contradicted
Id. at 731); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
826 (1970) (school officials have the burden of showing justification for students' sus-
pension for distributing underground newspaper critical of school administrators. Id. at
13).
37. 563 F.2d at 517.
38. Two of the defendants' witnesses-one psychologist and one psychiatrist-
were employed by the school system. Id. at 518.
39. Id. at 517.
40. Id. at 518.
41. Id.
42. Gilbert Trachtman's qualifications were noted in the dissenting opinion:
[P]rofessor of educational psychology, director of a school psychology pro-
gram and of the N.Y.U. children's consultation service, president of the school
[Vol. 27
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the defendants' assertions, describing the topics in the questionnaire
as "of normal interest to adolescents" and as "common subjects of con-
versation." Some experts noted that students at the Manhattan high
school were "bombarded with sexually explicit materials"43 between
home and school and opined that it was "highly unlikely that any
student could be harmed by answering the questionnaire." 44 Plaintiff
Gilbert Trachtman and one other expert did concede, however, that
there was "some possibility that some students would suffer emotional
damage as a result of the questionnaire." 45
After reviewing the evidence for both sides, the majority con-
cluded that the district court had overreached itself: "[t]he inquiry
of the district court should have been limited to whether defendants
had demonstrated a substantial basis for their conclusion that distri-
bution of the questionnaire would result in significant harm to some
Stuyvesant students. ' 46 While the majority acknowledged the difficulty
in formulating psychological predictions, it concluded:
[We] do not think defendants' inability to predict with certainty that
a certain number of students in all grades would be harmed should
mean that defendants are without power to protect students against
a foreseen harm. We believe that school authorities are sufficiently
experienced and knowledgeable concerning these matters, which have
been entrusted to them by the community; a federal court ought not
impose its own views in such matters where there is a rational basis
for the decisions and actions of the school authorities47
In concurrence, Judge Gurfein re-emphasized the similarity be-
tween physical disruption and psychological harm: "a blow to the
psyche may do more permanent damage than a blow to the chin." 4
He adopted the view that the case was better left to the discretion of
school officials, not only because of the dispute between the experts,
but also because the plaintiffs sought to elicit, not to distribute, in-
formation.
In dissent, Judge Mansfield urged that the standard for overcom-
ing first amendment rights be limited by the Tinker test followed in
Psychology Educators Council of New York State, past-president of the Nassau
County Psychology Association and of the School Division of the New York
Psychology Association and a consultant to numerous public and private schools.
Id. at 523.
43. Id. at 518.
44. Id. at 519.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 520.
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the Second Circuit. He characterized the majority's decision as "an
entirely too vague and nebulous extension of the concept of 'rights'
to support the drastic type of censorship and prior restraint sought by
defendants. '49 Disputing the notion that public schools could be
" 'marketplace[s] of ideas'" while protecting all students fTom emo-
tional stress, he argued that "[t]he possibilities for harmful censorship
under the guise of 'protecting' the rights of students against emotional
harm are sufficiently numerous to be frightening.""0
Turning to the evidence, Judge Mansfield stated that the de-
fendants had failed to establish a substantial basis for their conclu-
sion that the survey would cause some students psychological harm.
He noted that a witness for the plaintiffs had testified that "in more
than twenty-five years as a clinical psychologist I have never encoun-
tered a situation in which a child, adolescent, or adult has been ad-
versely affected by a questionnaire!" 51 Another witness for the plain-
tiffs had testified that whatever risk the survey posed was "minute com-
pared with the enormous benefit to be derived from students' learning
that their concerns are common and developmentally normal."52 Par-
ticular emphasis was given to the testimony of plaintiff Gilbert
Trachtman, who found the defendants' position that the survey could
be harmful anomalous:
The administration of Stuyvesant High School has, in the past,
offered rap groups on sexuality to its students and encouraged par-
ticipation in these open-ended, face to face verbal discussions. While
these groups may have been led by trained teachers, they neverthe-
less exposed students to a degree of peer pressure and verbal con-
frontation far in excess of any impact created by a voluntary and
anonymous written questionnaire. . . . I would suggest that any
youngster sufficiently fragile to suffer serious anxiety upon reading
questions which (s)he may ignore with impunity or respond to
anonymously, is a youngster too fragile to have survived the trip
from home to school.53
Judge Mansfield stressed that "[a]ll of the affidavits submitted by de-
fendants ...assume that a student possessed of fragile sensibilities
would not only read the questionnaire but make an intensive effort
to answer it . . . ."54 He argued that the proper standard should be
49. Id. at 521 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 523.
52. Id. at 525.
53. Id. at 524.
54. Id. at 522.
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"not the effect of the questionnaire upon one or even a few excep-
tionally immature and impressionable students but its effect on the
average."5 5 Accordingly, he proposed that the plaintiffs be permitted
to survey students in ninth through twelfth grades, and that the lower
court retain jurisdiction to supervise the distribution of the survey's
results.56
III. THE PRESS' RIGHT TO GATHER INFORMATION
VERSUS COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS
The first amendment protects the "full flow of information to
the public," 57 whether dissemination, reception, or gathering is in-
volved,58 although the degree of protection each receives may not be
55. Id.
56. Id. at 527.
57. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 664, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58. As numerous decisions illustrate, the first amendment protects the flow of
information at all stages. Judge Gurfein, the trial judge in the Pentagon Papers Case,
wrote:
A cantankerous press, an obstinate press, an ubiquitous press must be suffered
by those in authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom
of expression and the right of the people to know. . . . [I]t is not merely the
opinion of the editorial writer or of the columnist which is protected by the
First Amendment. It is the free flow of information so that the public will be
informed about the government and its actions.
United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 444
F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), Mr. Justice Blackmun
made it clear that the protection of the flow of information is not confined to political
speech:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it . . . may seem, is nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product,
for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will
be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public
interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 765. In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), Mr. Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority, acknowledged that the first amendment protects newsgathering, id. at
833, but held that the protection did not afford reporters a "right of access to prisons
or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Id. at 834. In Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. at 707, the majority conceded that "news gathering is not without
its First Amendment protections . . . ." In his dissent in Branzburg, Mr. Justice Stewart
explained that the policies underlying the first amendment support the right to gather
information:
A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. The full
flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee would be
severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the process by
which news is assembled and disseminated .... News must not be unnecessarily
cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to
19781
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the same. Thus, exceptional circumstances are needed to justify a prior
restraint of publication, 9 and the state cannot impose conditions on
the receipt of constitutionally protected information."' While the Su-
preme Court has recognized that newsgathering qualifies for first
amendment protection-"without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated"',-the degree of pro-
tection has been the subject of some controversy. 2 In general, the
Court has employed a balancing test, concluding that the societal in-
terest in the gathering of information does not "guarantee the press
a constitutional right of special access to information not available to
the public generally." 63 As a result, the Court has held that a reporter
may claim no first amendment privilege against testifying before a
grand jury about the identities of confidential sources; 4 that the press
has no special right of access to prisons; 63 and that the first amend-
ment does not protect newspaper offices from third-party searches con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant.6
While these decisions impose restrictions on the right of the press
to gather information, they also suggest a test of considerable strict-
ness in determining whether the public interest in the free collection
of information is outweighed by other social concerns. In Branzburg
publish would be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather
news, of some dimensions, must exist.
Id. at 727-28. As one commentator has noted, "[m]aintaining the flow of . . .informa-
tion [of general interest] depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dis-
semination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." Note, The
Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1505
(1974).
59. Mr. JusT'ce Brennan, concurring in New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Pentagon Papers Case) described the threat to national
security needed to justify a prior restraint as "kindred to imperiling the safety of a
transport already at sea." Id. at 727. See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976).
60. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
61. 408 U.S. at 681 (majority opinion).
62. Dissenting in Branzburg Mr. Justice Stewart proposed that newsgathering be
afforded protection equal to that given other first amendment freedoms. Thus, before
the government may compel a reporter to reveal his or her sources, it must:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has informa-
tion that is clearly relevant to a specific violation of the law; (2) demonstrate
that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling
and overriding interest in the information.
Id. at 743 (footnotes omitted).
63. Id. at 684 (citations omitted).
64. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665.
65. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
66. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 46 U.S.L.W. 4546 (May 31, 1978).
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v. Hayes, where the Court held that society's interest in the preven-
tion of crime was sufficient to overcome the right of a reporter to re-
fuse to name those he had observed processing hashish, even the ma-
jority noted that the "state's interest must be 'compelling' or 'para-
mount' to justify . . . an indirect burden on First Amendment
rights."' 7 In Pell v. Procunier, Mr. Justice Stewart, the Court's most
ardent proponent of the right to gather information,68 wrote the ma-
jority opinion, which indicated that "institutional considerations such
as security," give prison officials the right to limit press access to spe-
cific inmates when other means of communication remain open, 69 but
acknowledged that the first amendment protected the newsgathering
activities of the press.7 0
Thus, whether or not they are protected as strongly as other first
amendment interests, the press' newsgathering activities may not be
burdened by governmental action without a showing of countervail-
ing interests of considerable magnitude.
A. Minors, Schools, and Unwilling Participants
The major countervailing interest asserted in Trachtman was the
possibility of harmful psychological effects on some of the students
asked to respond to the survey. Whether this possibility should have
been sufficient to outweigh the Voice's interest in gathering informa-
tion is discussed below. 1 Apart from such alleged psychological effects,
however, none of the other elements present in Trachtman-the in-
volvement of minors as survey participants, the fact that the survey
would take place at school, the possible unwillingness of the partici-
pants-would, either alone or together, have been sufficient to over-
come the first amendment interests at issue.
1. Minors. In accordance with the broad principle announced
in Prince v. Massachusetts that "state authority over children's activi-
67. 408 U.S. at 680 (footnotes omitted).
68. See his dissenting opinions in Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 and Zurcher, 46
U.S.L.W. at 4552.
69. 417 U.S. at 826.
70. Id. Most recently, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court framed the issue
in terms of the applicability of the fourth amendment to searches of newspaper offices,
and held that the reasonableness provisions of the fourth amendment provided adequate
protection for the first amendment interests threatened. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting,
wrote that the result of the Court's decision, "wholly inimical to the First Amendment,
will be a diminishing flow of potentially important information to the public." 46
U.S.L.W. at 4550.
71. See text accompanying notes 98-103 infra.
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ties is broader than over like actions of adults,"7 2 the Court has made
special provisions for minors in some circumstances. Thus, the state
may restrict a parent's control by prohibiting child labor,73 or it may
adopt stricter standards of obscenity for minors than for adults? 4
Yet the mere presence of minors is not grounds for curtailment of
first amendment freedoms. That was Tinker's basic point. And in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,7 5 the Court rejected an argument
that prohibiting drive-in theaters from showing films containing nu-
dity was a reasonable measure to protect children. Citing Tinker, the
Court stated:
Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other
legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the
young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable
for them. In most circumstances, the values protected by the First
Amendment are no less applicable when government seeks to control
the flow of information to minors.76
2. The Institutional Environment. First amendment rights may
be overcome, in certain circumstances, by the public interest in pre-
serving an institutional environment, although the restriction on
speech or press must be proved necessary for the preservation of the
institution's central purpose. For instance, censorship of prisoners' mail
is permissible only in narrowly defined circumstances to "further one
or more of the substantial government interests of security, order and
rehabilitation." 77 The press, it has been shown, can claim no right of
direct access to particular prisoners if the presence of journalists in-
side the prison presents security problems and if alternative means of
communication are available 78
In schools, it has been argued, "government enjoy[s] power to
preserve such tranquility as the facilities' central purpose requires...
but no power to exclude peaceful speech or assembly compatible with
that purpose. '79 Tinker, it will be recalled, exempted from first
amendment irotecti6i -acfivity that "materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."80
72. 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
73. 321 U.S. 158.
74. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
75. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
76. Id. at 209.
77. Procunier v. Martincz, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
78. Pell V. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817.
79. L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWv § 12-21, at 690 (1978).
80. 393 U.S. at 513.
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Until Trachtman the Tinker exception was interpreted narrowly and
applied only to threatened physical disruption of the learning atmo-
sphere. In Grayned v. City of Rockford8' the Court provided an ex-
ample of a regulation limited in scope and accommodating both first
amendment interests and the needs of the school atmosphere. Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall, writing for the majority, reversed the defendant's con-
viction based upon an ordinance outlawing picketing-other than
peaceful labor picketing-near schools, but upheld his conviction
based upon an ordinance prohibiting making noise within a specified
distance of school grounds. The anti-noise ordinance, the Court con-
cluded, was "narrowly tailored to further [the city's] compelling in-
terest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the stu-
dents' learning, and [did] not unnecessarily interfere with first
amendment rights."8' 2 Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Educa-
tion held that school officials might properly suspend students who
created a disturbance by wearing "freedom buttons" and attempting
to force others to do so.83 Regulations of first amendment rights exer-
cised in or near schools thus have been permitted only to preserve so-
ciety's interest in the peaceful operation of educational institutions.
3. The Possibility of Unwilling Participants. In general, the
presence of unwilling viewers or listeners limits first amendment
rights only when the communication threatens to intrude upon mem-
bers of a captive audience or the privacy of the home. Customarily,
the rationale applied by the Court is that the limited privacy interests
of persons in public places do not overcome society's interest in free
expression. In public conveyances or homes, however, people need not
be subject to objectionable displays from which they cannot or should
not be required to escape. Therefore, the state may not prevent the
public display of offensive words either to protect public morality, to
shield citizens from offensive displays, or to avert the possibility of a
disturbance.84 On the other hand, a city-operated transportation sys-
81. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
82. Id. at 119.
83. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
84. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970). Defendant Cohen was arrested for
wearing a jacket bearing the words, 'Tuck the Draft' in a courthouse corridor, and
charged with disturbing the peace by offensive conduct. The California Court of Appeal
upheld his conviction because it was "reasonably foreseeable" that his conduct would
incite others to a violent reaction. Quoting Tinker, Mr. Justice Harlan's majority opinion
dismissed the incitement to violence rationale as an " 'undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension of disturbance' [which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of ex-
pression. We have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are
standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities with
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tern need not accept political advertisements,85 and the right to com-
municate does not include the right to mail unsolicited "pandering
advertisements" into homes.86 When determining the degree of pro-
tection that speech is afforded, the Court considers the nature of the
forum sought to be used by those asserting the violation of first
amendment rights.
Public schools, it may be argued, are unique forums: their duty
to "educate the young for citizenship" 87 requires that students be per-
mitted the broadest possible exercise of constitutional rights, accord-
ing to Tinker. Nonetheless, first amendment rights may be limited
since students are compelled by law to attend school and are thus in
some sense captives. In addition, courts have recognized the "impor-
tant, delicate, and highly discretionary functions""" of school admin-
istrators, and have been reluctant to interfere in the operation of
schools.
Where free speech rights are at issue, however, the courts are not
persuaded by the argument that students or teachers have no right to
expose others to their views. In Tinker, the Court found no evidence
that the wearing of armbands constituted "collision with the rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone."8 9 Similarly, the Sec-
ond Circuit, in James v. Board of Education, described students as
a "captive group" in reference to the display of an armband by a
teacher, but held that the teacher was entitled to protest the Vietnam
War.90
execrations like that uttered by Cohen." Id. at 22. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205.
85. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The city justified
its policy against accepting political advertisements as economically sound (it eliminated
the possibility that short-term political advertising during election periods would crowd
out long-term non-political advertisers) and defended by pointing to the possibility of
favoritism and the risk of subjecting a captive audience to political propaganda. The
plaintiff's assertion of a right of access to a publicly-owned area was outweighed by the
city's right to control its use. In concurrence, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that com-
muters had a right "to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy" and that this
sight "preclude[d] the city from transforming its vehicles . . . into forums for the
dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience." Id. at 307.
86. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Bulk mailers un-
successfully challenged the constitutionality of an act limiting the mailing of such
materials. The Supreme Court concluded that "no one has a right to press even 'good'
ideas on an unwilling recipient. That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of
the home and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must
be captives everywhere." Id. at 738. See also Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell,
425 U.S. 610 (1976).
87. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
88. Id. at 637.
89. 393 U.S. at 508.
90. 461 F.2d at 573.
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The argument that students are captives was advanced to expand
their exercise of first amendment rights in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette,91 a 1943 case which held that because the
state compelled attendance it could not authorize the expulsion of
students whose religion would not permit them to salute the flag. The
argument that captive students should be subject to a restricted flow
of information in their school newspaper was expressly rejected by a
Virginia district court in Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board92
when, relying on Lehman, defendant school administrators attempted
to prevent publication of an article on contraception. The court
quoted Justice Brandeis in Packer Corporation v. Utah, where he
spoke of newspapers and magazines as requiring "'some seeking by
the one who is to see and read the advertisement.' ,,93 The district
court in Gambino observed:
No substantive distinction can be drawn between the relative lack
of choice in exposure to the communication in this case and that in
Tinker. If anything, the students of Hayfield are less captive because
they must act affirmatively to pick up the newspaper. In Tinker the
non-protesting students were required to avert their eyes to avoid the
message. 94
The relation between captivity and privacy interests is, however,
a delicate one, and attempts to elicit personal information, when spon-
sored by the school, may be considered an abuse of educators' discre-
tion. In Merriken v. Cressman,95 a junior high school student and his
mother brought an action to enjoin the administration of a commer-
cial drug intervention program in his school. The program, which
sought to identify and counsel potential drug abusers, was to be
adopted through the use of a questionnaire which asked students to
provide information about race and religion, as well as family com-
position and closeness. In addition, it asked students to identify class-
mates who made "unusual or odd remarks" and who had difficulty
getting along with other students.96 The company promoting the pro-
gram made no provision to safeguard the identities of students tar-
geted as potential drug abusers, and school authorities had permitted
the company to institute the program without the "affirmative con-
91. 319 U.S. 624.
92. 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 157 (1977).
93. 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932), quoted in 429 F. Supp. at 735.
94. Id. at 736.
95. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
96. Id. at 916.
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sent" of students' parents. The district court held that the program
was a violation of students' right to privacy, and a usurpation of the
"exclusive privileges of parents. ' '9 7
While the survey in Trachtman also sought to collect highly per-
sonal information, it is distinguishable from the Merriken survey. The
Trachtman survey was not presented under the sponsorship of school
authorities, which may tend to increase the likelihood of coercion;
and it did not attempt to collect information about other students.
Participation was entirely voluntary. Moreover, the survey was not
planned as part of any formal counseling program; it was, in fact, pre-
sented to the student populace as an attempt at "personal intercom-
munication." While surveys initiated and conducted by students may
be subject to abuses of confidentiality and peer pressure, adequate
procedural safeguards in their administration could cure these prob-
lems. Although the Trachtman court might have based its holding on
a finding that the questionnaire was an invasion of students' privacy
interests, and that the character of the survey made it impossible for
students to make an informed decision about whether to participate,
it did not do so.
B. The Possibility of Psychological Harm
Previous decisions have made it clear that only the most com-
pelling countervailing interests are deserving of greater protection
than first amendment rights. When the possibility of physical disrup-
tion is asserted, the harm must be clearly threatened. The Supreme
Court established a stringent test for physical disruption in Cohen v.
California: "substantial numbers of citizens [must be] standing ready
to strike out physically .... "98 When the Trachtman court permitted
the possibility of psychological harm to outweigh the right of students
to gather information, it deferred to the judgment of school officials,
since "psychological diagnoses . . . are ... difficult . . . ."" In effect,
the court permitted the possibility of emotional disturbance to over-
come first amendment rights without requiring a substantial showing
that such harm was likely.
Yet the threat of psychological harm lurks in the background of
many major first amendment cases. The Supreme Court has in the
past found the public interest in free speech and expression of greater
97. Id. at 922.
98. 403 U.S. at 23.
99. 563 F.2d at 519.
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concern than the protection of emotional interests, as evidenced by
the number of cases in which the possibility of psychological harm
might have been but was not considered by the Court.
A Jehovah's Witness who went from house to house in a pre-
dominantly Catholic neighborhood broadcasting a record which at-
tacked the Catholic religion was protected by the first amendment,
the Court ruled in Cantwell v. Connecticut.0 0 American Nazis could
not be enjoined from displaying swastikas and parading through a
largely Jewish town, even though thousands of residents of that town
were concentration camp survivors, according to Village of Skokie
v. National Socialist Party of America.1 1 Scabrous language displayed
in public to express a political point of view is deserving of first
amendment protection, the Court held in Cohen v. California.0 2 A
city's interest in protecting children from highly visible displays of
nudity does not permit the banning of all -films containing nudity
from drive-in screens, said Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 03
While none of these decisions advocates the infliction of psycho-
logical harm, all reflect a social policy which deems first amendment
values of greater importance than the risk of offending or disturbing
a small group of people. In Cantwell, Skokie, Cohen, and Erznoznik,
children of no greater emotional stability than those in Trachtman
were included in the group of people the Court found obliged to sub-
mit to offensive displays. In each case the possibility of psychological
harm seems to have been at least as imminent as in Trachtman. If
emotional interests are to be treated by courts as deserving of greater
protection than first amendment rights, the standard applied should
be analogous to the compelling or substantial showing required of
other countervailing interests.
CONCLUSION
The standard accepted by the Trachtman court when consider-
ing the possibility of psychological harm appears to be inconsistent
with previous first amendment cases, because it permits the rights of
a concededly small number of students whose very existence cannot
readily be proved to overcome the rights of all students freely to ex-
change ideas. The addition of an allegation of possible psychological
100. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
101. 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
102. 403 U.S. 15.
103. 422 U.S. 205.
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harm to the elements in Trachtman should, therefore, be insufficient
to overcome the first amendment issues at stake in the case.
Ahile the dissent in Trachtman found "no significant legal dis-
tinction" between the gathering and dissemination of information
about sex, 10 4 the concurring opinion emphasized that the holding was
limited to attempts to gather information, "lest the majority decision
serve as an unintended precedent in derogation of First Amendment
right."'1 5 Nonetheless, if the right to collect information is a first
amendment right, the decision in Trachtman v. Anker may repre-
sent a significant inroad into the rights of high school students. As
the conflict between the parties' experts indicates, it is easy to assert
and difficult to disprove the possibility of psychological harm.
DEBORAH F. PETERS
104. 563 F.2d at 526.
105. Id. at 520.
